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Taxing Choices: International Competition, Domestic Institutions
and the Transformation of Corporate Tax Policy
Duane Swank
Abstract
Since the 1980s, notable corporate tax base broadening and rate reductions have occurred
throughout the rich democracies. Scholars agree that tax competition for mobile assets shapes
this transformation. I address two questions in this paper. First, what form has tax competition
taken and, second, how have domestic institutions conditioned competition’s impact? I build on
past work and argue that tax competition is characterized by the (Stackelberg) leadership of the
United States as opposed to alternative forms of competition. At the same time, domestic
institutions, especially the degree to which the nation is a coordinated versus liberal market
economy, are central determinants of the pace of reform. I test these propositions with models of
1982-to-2008 tax rate change in 18 capitalist democracies. I find that rising trade openness and
capital mobility place downward pressures on tax rates, the U. S. adoption of the neoliberal tax
model engenders significant competitive responses from other nations, and that the institutions of
coordinated economies slow the pace of neoliberal reforms. High public debt, left-leaning
median voters, and institutional veto points also significantly constrain tax policy change. I
conclude with some reflections on tax policy in the wake of the global financial crisis and on
neoliberalism and institutional change in advanced democratic capitalism.
Keywords: corporate taxation, globalization, institutional change, tax competition, varieties of
capitalism
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Neoliberal reforms in taxation have spread across the developed democracies since the
1980s (e.g., Swank and Steinmo 2002; Genschel and Schwartz 2011). Policy makers have altered
tax rates, the relative emphasis on equity and efficiency, and the use of tax policy to accomplish
collective goals: corporate and personal income tax rates were scaled back, the number of
brackets was cut and inflation-indexed, and many tax credits, allowances and exemptions were
scaled back to broaden the tax base. Trends toward market-friendly tax structure have been
pronounced for corporate income taxation (Ganghoff 2004).
In the current paper, I extend my past work (Swank and Steinmo 2002; Swank 2006) and
address the question of why developed nations shifted to market-conforming corporate tax
policy.1 Past research offers some answers. The “first generation” of studies on the tax impacts
of globalization has shown that trade openness and capital mobility hasten cuts in statutory and
effective corporate tax rates (see Leibrecht and Hochgatterer 2012). More recent work, however,
has addressed two important (and yet unanswered) questions (e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg
2004; Devereau et al 2008; Hays 2003; 2009; Swank 2006). First, these studies theorize and test
competing, complex models of strategic interdependence between nations. At a minimum, most
recent work allows for some type of spatial policy diffusion as nations respond to policy change
in other political economies (e.g., Franseze and Hays 2008). Some scholars go beyond simple
diffusion models and argue that competitor nations strategically act on the basis of recent
1

Given the assumption of durable democratic institutions and issues of data availability,

the sample consists of 18 nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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political and economic signals and simultaneously set tax rates on mobile assets in a Nash
competitive game (e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg 2004); I have argued that both theory and the
empirical record point to the predominate role of the 1980s first move of the United States, the
world’s dominant economy, and the subsequent competitive responses of other nations (Swank
2006). I provide a comparative assessment of these and alternative models of tax competition
below.
Second, recent studies raise the issue of how domestic institutions matter to the pace and
depth of tax policy change. For instance, Hays (2003; 2009) has stressed that the historically low
taxes of capital-poor consensus democracies actually allow policy makers in these polities to
respond to contemporary capital mobility with increases in taxes on mobile assets. Others have
emphasized that the degrees to which the median voter has shifted right on redistribution and
right-of-center parties have governed in recent years should be consequential for tax policy
change (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 2009; Swank, 2006). In
addition, the strength of coordinated market institutions should significantly condition the pace
of neoliberal reforms (Swank 2006; 2008).2
I organize my analysis as follows. First, after commenting on recent tax trends, I more
fully outline and juxtapose theories about tax competition and domestic institutional impacts on
policy change. I then develop empirical models of corporate tax rates and assess these with 1982to-2008 data from 18 nations. As most published work rarely extends far into the twenty-first
2

This paper significantly elaborates the theory in Swank (2006; 2008) that the

institutions of coordinated economies fundamentally shape the pace of neoliberal reforms, and
tests the relative importance of coordination and other institutional factors.
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century, an extension of analyses of tax competition and domestic institutions to 2008 is
important: continued internationalization, political and institutional change, and significant tax
reforms from the late 1990s to 2008 in several nations call for new analysis.3 I conclude with
some reflections about the future of tax policy and the broader spread of neoliberalism and
institutional change in advanced democratic capitalism.
Corporate Tax Policy Change, Tax Competition, and Domestic Institutions
Since the early 1980s, the structure of relatively high statutory rates and extensive use of
tax instruments to target investment was significantly altered in virtually all nations. Figure 1
documents the secular trend (see Note 1 on included nations). Policy makers reduced statutory
corporate tax rates on average from 49 percent in 1982 to 28 percent in 2010. Yet, the crossnational variability of corporate statutory rates (as measured by the coefficient of variation) did
not decline; if anything it has slightly increased. An initial up-tick in variability occurs in the late
1980s (temporally corresponding to the differential responses to U.S. tax reforms), and the
modestly higher variability is sustained to the present. Most notably, the early 1980s “high-tax
equilibrium” is largely replaced by a “low-tax equilibrium” in the 2000s.4
3

I do not take the analysis past 2008 because data are unavailable for some institutional

dimensions in recent years. Also, the global financial crisis and attendant recession create
dramatic oscillations in economic forces and generate special short-term tax policy measures.
These factors complicate drawing general inferences. I do offer, however, observations drawn
from the paper’s analyses on post-2008 trajectories of tax policy in the conclusions.
4

Policy makers also eliminated or reduced various tax allowances that had lowered

effective corporate tax rates on less profitable enterprises and on reinvested profits (e.g., Boskin
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— Figure 1 about here —
At the same time, the pace and depth of policy reform varies across nations. Some
nations (the Anglo democracies and the Netherlands) cut statutory rates relatively quickly (and
concomitantly reduced or eliminated tax-based investment incentives); this generally occurred in
the mid- to late 1980s. Many other countries acted in the early 1990s (the Nordic and most
continental European nations). For a few polities (Italy and Japan), significant market-oriented
tax reforms did not occur until the late 1990s or early 2000's.5 What roles do international
integration, tax competition, and domestic institutions play in this transformation of tax policy?
Globalization, Tax Competition, and Policy Change
The “globalization thesis” of tax policy change has been a prominent focus of extensive
research. The common version of this argument suggests that the capacity of mobile asset
holders to move investment across national borders forces incumbent governments (regardless of
ideology or constituency) to compete for investment. Taxes on capital (and generally mobile,
high income earners) are progressively lowered while tax burdens on relatively immobile factors
and McClure 1990; Ganghof 2000; Genschel 1999). Effective average tax rates on profitable
corporations – rates that differ only modestly from statutory rates – were reduced from 42 to 30
percent between 1982 and 2005. Rates on less profitable enterprises declined from 34 to 25
percent during the same period.
5

It is also important to observe that despite notable cuts in statutory tax rates,

governments collected on average roughly 30 percent of capital income in revenue in 1982 and
in 2008. The sources of this stability have been addressed elsewhere (Swank and Steinmo 2002;
Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 2009) and, for practical reasons, are not directly analyzed here.
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and activities (i.e., most labor and consumption) are raised. The majority of “first generation”
studies on tax competition, in fact, report a negative association between general levels of trade
openness and capital mobility on the one hand, and statutory and effective corporate tax rates on
the other (Leibrecht and Hochgatterer 2012; Genschel and Schwartz 2011).
Strategic Interdependence: The United States as Stackelberg Leader. Recent work on tax
policy makes clear incumbent governments not only respond to commonly experienced pressures
from international openness (the most rudimentary type of tax competition), they are also likely
to take leads from policy change in competitor nations (e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg 2004;
Hayes 2003; Swank 2006). 6 One highly plausible form of strategic tax competition is that of
competitive national responses to the first move of a Stackelberg leader; the United States is the
primary candidate to play this role.7 As I argued in earlier work (Swank 2006; 2008), the catalyst
of contemporary tax policy reform is the U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act: top statutory corporate
rates were cut over several years from 46 to 34 percent, the investment tax credit was suspended,
6

Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) note that the diffusion of neoliberal policies may

also occur through coercion, rational learning, and social emulation. In Swank (2006; 2008),
however, I find little evidence of these other forms of diffusion. For some new evidence on tax
policy learning, see Jensen and Linstädt 2012.
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A Stackelberg leader is formally a large, dominant economy that is a net lender of

capital; I use the term more loosely to designate a large, dominant economy whose domestic
markets and international flows are so large as to shape economic policy and performance in the
pool of similarly situated economies. Also see Kumar and Quinn (2012) on the U.S. as a global
Stackelberg leader in tax reform.
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and accelerated depreciation and a variety of other allowances were reduced.
The potential international impacts of 1986 Act were quickly evident. Enacted in the
context of convergence in policy-maker thinking about taxation and motivated by common
concerns over economic stagnation, the reform “sent shock waves to other countries” (Tanzi
1987, p. 335). Tanzi, in fact, cites a variety of OECD, IMF, and country-specific sources to
illustrate that in the wake of the U.S. reforms, policy makers in most advanced democracies
became deeply worried that lower marginal rates may result in a “capital drain” of mobile
investment to the United States. 8 Other analysts agree that policy makers in most nations
quickly appreciated that significant reductions in the statutory corporate rate increase the intake
of foreign direct investment and retain the income from that investment in the low-tax
jurisdiction by reducing the incentive to shift earnings to other nations through transfer pricing
(Boskin and McClure 1990; Pechman 1988). As scholars also note, the international impacts of
corporate tax rate reduction should be especially large if initiated by countries such as the U.S.
whose supply of foreign capital and domestic markets are very important for many countries.9
Ganghof and Eccelston (2004) argue that these dynamics clearly contribute to the significant
downward movement in corporate rates in other nations after the U.S. tax reforms.
Nash Games of Competitive Strategic Interdependence. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004)
8

Britain reduced corporate rates in 1984; Ireland cut corporate tax rates in 1981. Several

other nations had enacted modest neoliberal reforms (e.g., Boskin and McClure 1990; Peckman
1988; Tanzi 1987). However, the large majority of nations had yet to act in 1986.
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For instance, the United States accounted for between 40 and 50 percent of all FDI and

portfolio capital inflows at the beginning of the 21st Century (IMF 1998).
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have offered what is arguably the most plausible alternative to the Stackelberg model. They
propose a Nash-type game of strategic interaction where tax reforms of nations are chosen
simultaneously. Significant uncertainty exists with regard to other nations’ likely tax reforms
(and for the likelihood that reforms will be rewarded by capital investment). Each nation’s effort
at tax reform is determined by domestic political and economic costs; these take the form of
constituency costs (e.g., citizen backlash over perceived attacks on fairness) and political
transactions costs such as those generated by negotiations over policy reform among ideological
distinct governing partners. Economic payoffs for tax cuts are affected by transactions costs on
capital movements such as those created by capital controls.
At the same time, national policy makers must simultaneously weigh tax reform effort in
other nations. They monitor competitors with respect to constituency and political transactions
costs as well as constraints on capital mobility. Shifts in the ideological position of the
incumbent government (or more fundamentally the median voter), declines in ideological
distance among government coalition parties, and liberalization of capital controls all signal
reduced friction in tax policy reform effort in competitor nations. The game is played and policy
makers adapt positions based on payoffs and new conditions. I will assess below the Basinger
and Hallerberg model, the Stackelberg model, and other types of tax competition.
Politics, Institutions, and the Spread of Neoliberal Tax Reform
Political institutions should directly shape the pace and depth of tax policy change.
Institutions should also condition policy-maker responsiveness to international pressures. I assess
three types of models of domestic political institutional mediation of international tax
competition. First, Hays (2003; 2009) argues that consensus democratic institutions in relatively
8

small and capital-poor polities – democracies characterized by proportional representation, many
effective parliamentary parties, oversized cabinets and related characteristics of Lijphart’s (2012)
executives/parties dimension of consensus democracy – have traditionally enacted low levels of
capital taxation. This is so because business parties are guaranteed representation by consensus
institutions and because dramatic redistributions of income possible in majoritarian systems by a
single-party government of workers are eschewed in consensus democratic contexts (also see
Hertel-Fernandez and Martin 2014). Hays theorizes that with capital mobility, (typically capital
rich) majoritarian polities will reduce tax rates while consensus democracies may have room
(given extant, low tax rates) to increase capital tax rates to achieve optimal revenue-raising tax
levels.
The second model, prefigured in earlier discussion, stresses direct and mediating roles of
politics, namely, the political transactions costs of policy reform created by fragmented
institutions and the constituency costs of (neoliberal) policy change generated by egalitarian
ideological forces. Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) have argued that multiparty legislatures and
cabinets and horizontally and vertically fragmented political authority (i.e., partisan and
institutional veto points) create opportunities for opponents to slow or block policy change. In
addition, as noted above, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) and Swank (2006; 2008) have argued
that constraints on policy change are created by domestic “constituency costs” such as
ideological resistance of electorates to market-oriented reforms. Relatedly, Plümper, Troeger,
and Winner (2009) stress that societal fairness norms (for instance, public support for
redistribution) will constrain the reduction of tax burdens on corporations and capital income.
Thus, I account for the direct tax policy effects of consensus institutions (partisan veto points),
9

institutional veto points, and constituency costs; I also assess whether or not these factors
mediate pressures from international tax competition.
Varieties of Democratic Capitalism. Third, in my preferred model of tax competition and
democratic institutions (and, here, I significantly extend the argument made in Swank [2006;
2008]), I assume that all policy makers seek to maximize – subject to political economic and
institutional constraints – economic performance and political support. In the short term,
incumbent governments will also strive to maintain revenue levels to fund preferred programs as
well as limit public deficits and debt. Left and Christian Democratic governments, however, have
different intermediate and long-term targets for the level and distribution of taxes than center
and, especially, right parties. Ultimately, the likelihood of a shift to neoliberal tax policy should
be a function of the relative weights assigned by policy makers to the expected political and
economic benefits and costs associated with neoliberal tax structure. These assessments, and the
ultimate decision to adopt or not adopt neoliberal reforms, should be, in turn, influenced by the
foundational institutions of the political economy, namely, the degree to which markets are
coordinated by employers, labor and the state.
To streamline a complex argument, one can imagine a Samuelson-type rule for optimal
policy change: tax rate reductions will proceed until MBPOLECON = MCPOLECON, where MB and
MC refer, respectively, to marginal political and economic benefits and costs of policy reform. In
this highly stylized model of policy choice, MBPOLECON and MCPOLECON are given by the
following:
MBPOLECON = b1(∑INVEST) + b2(∑SUPPORT)
MCPOLECON = τ1(∑CONSTITUENT) + τ2(∑TRANSACT)+ τ3(∑INEFFICIENCY),
10

where, ∑INVEST is the sum across all households of the income and employment gains from
greater capital investment and ∑SUPPORT is the sum across all households of the increase in
vote support and government performance approval (that flow, for instance, from credit-claiming
by incumbents). ∑CONSTITUENT is the sum of negative ideological/normative effects across
households of tax reforms, ∑TRANSACT is the societal sum of political costs of negotiating
change, and ∑INEFFICIENCY is the sum across households of negative economic effects of
neoliberal reforms (as explained below). The parameters b1 and b2 are decreasing functions of
coordination of markets and the parameters τ1, τ2, and τ3 are increasing functions of coordination.
To elaborate, countries may be classified by the extent to which employers (labor and the
state) develop institutions of coordination in the face of firms’ control, information, and
collective action problems in purely competitive markets (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001). Labor
and industrial relations are addressed through national or sectoral collective bargaining among
relatively well-organized employer and labor associations. Labor-management relations within
the firm are organized by works councils and other cooperative enterprise arrangements.
Collective business goods problems (e.g., training, R&D) are addressed through enterprise
consortiums and other cooperative firm associations. Close coordination of finance and
producers through bank finance and cross-holding (as opposed to equity markets) foster longterm development (i.e., incremental innovation) of high quality, diversified products.
Coordination of economic activity by business is supported by stable long-run labor-business
relations and by complementary state regulation.
Traditionally interventionist tax policy – the “high tax equilibrium” of high rates and
extensive investment allowances – has played two key roles in coordinated economies. First, it
11

has facilitated state promotion of long-run growth through regional and sector targeting of
investment during economic modernization and restructuring. In the Nordic countries, for
instance, high statutory rates on uninvested profits coupled with general investment reserves and
targeted investment incentives complemented other supply-side policies (credit and active labor
market policy) in promoting smooth business cycle adjustment and high employment (Huber and
Stephens 1998). Second, tax policies of high statutory capital tax rates (and high employer social
insurance contributions) have been instrumental to the maintenance of labor’s acceptance of
ownership and managerial prerogatives, general social solidarity, and long-term stability in labor
and industrial relations (Swank 2002, Ch. 5).
Given these considerations, the costs and benefits of neoliberal tax reform across
varieties of capitalism is clear. In terms of costs, policy makers in coordinated market economies
(hereafter CMEs) face potentially high constituency costs with neoliberal reform as citizens
commonly display more collectivist and pro-redistributive attitudes than those in liberal market
economies (hereafter LMEs). For instance, the simple bivariate correlation between support for
redistribution by the median voter and coordination across the 18 focal nations in 2008 is .43, p <
.05. (See Appendix on measurement and data sources.) Political transactions costs are also high;
CMEs are characterized by consensus institutions that foster inclusiveness of societal interests
and diffuse power across multiparty legislatures and cabinets (e.g., Lijphart 2012; Martin and
Swank 2012). CMEs are also characterized by extensive national and sectoral delegation of
policy making power to employers and labor. As such, national policy makers in CMEs typically
face an array of bipartite and tripartite forums that accord opportunities for opponents to block
policy change.
12

Neoliberal policy reform may also create inefficiencies in CMEs. As Hall and Soskice
(2001) and Hall and Gingerich (2009) have argued, elements of national economic models are
functionally interdependent. Fundamental reforms in one area have significant potential impacts
on the performance of other features of the model. More concretely, business, labor, and the state
have interests in the maintenance of the core elements of the country’s predominant model
(Soskice 1999). For instance, as Thelen (1999) demonstrates for Germany for the relevant
timeframe of reform, German employer support for maintenance of basic features of
coordination and the policies they entail was arguably rooted in the interests of business in
promoting long-term stability in the labor and industrial relations system. These interests are
grounded in the fact that producers in CMEs rely on stable production to maintain share in highly
competitive international markets for high-end products (also see Martin and Swank 2012, esp.
Ch. 11). Generally, the greater the coordination of the economy, the higher the economic
uncertainty to policy makers from adoption of the market-conforming tax paradigm.
With respect to benefits of neoliberal tax policy, the potential for economic performancebased gains in votes and incumbent public approval in CMEs is more limited than in LMEs. This
is so because, as noted, CMEs have consensus-based institutions as opposed to majoritarian
institutions. And, as extensive research on economic determinants on votes and approval has
shown, consensus institutions such as multiparty cabinets blur macroeconomic policy
responsibility and, hence, blunt the strength of economic effects on the vote and approval ratings
(see the synoptic survey in Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008). With regard to economic benefits
of tax policy reform, CMEs (as LMEs) enjoy potential income and employment gains from
capital inflows. Yet, while formal capital controls have largely been abolished in the CMEs,
13

several core features of the CME model may be in tension with global market-driven allocation
of capital that is fostered by tax competition. For instance, significant formal and informal
impediments to mergers and takeovers, continued reliance on long-term bank finance, and other
persistent features of coordination certainly mitigate some of potential market efficiency effects
of successful tax competition in CMEs (that are expected to materialize in LMEs).10
In sum, I expect the parameters capturing political and economic benefits of neoliberal
tax reform to decrease with coordination; those parameters that gauge political (constituency and
transactions) and economic costs of reform should increase with coordination. With respect to
concrete hypotheses, one way in which CME institutions mediate tax competition is through the
operation of consensus political institutions that are associated with CMEs; another set of
mechanisms involves the greater level of support for collectivist and egalitarian policies
associated with CME structures. As such, the CME hypothesis is consistent with – indeed
subsumes – the consensus and median voter hypotheses. A final set of mediating mechanisms
consists of the complementarities among CME institutions and their bias (discussed above)
toward non-market activities, policies, and practices. As such, we should expect the level of
coordination to mediate tax competition in general, and in the presence of significant mediation
of international competition by consensus institutions or by left-leaning voters.
Empirical Models of Tax Policy Reform
10

Research has shown, for instance, reforms that introduce or extend short-term market

forces in one area (e.g., capital markets) while coordination persists in another (e.g., labor and
industrial relations) may result in lower economic growth (e.g., Hall and Gingerich 2009; Martin
and Swank 2012).
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I draw on Swank and Steinmo (2002) and Swank (2006) to develop tests of hypotheses
on neoliberal reform, tax competition and domestic institutions. In this work, tax rates were
modeled as a function of international capital mobility and trade openness, domestic economic
pressures (e.g., long-term unemployment), and public sector debt as well as business cycle
dynamics (economic growth, profits, and investment), partisan control of government, and prior
levels of tax rates. Swank and Steinmo (2002) estimated the models with 1981-1995 data for 14
developed democracies; Swank (2006; 2008) extended the analysis to the 1982-to-1998 period
and incorporated policy interdependence by assessing diffusion processes.
In the present paper, I extend the sample a full decade – to 2008 – and use data from 18
advanced nations; the theoretical and substantive scope of the paper is expanded to include new
tests of tax competition and domestic politics and institutions not considered in earlier work. I
focus primarily on statutory corporate tax rates: statutory corporate tax rates are a direct indicator
of policy, closely proxy the structural change in corporate taxation, and are the most visible sign
of nations’ tax burdens on corporate income. Statutory corporate rates are also strongly
correlated (.90 or greater for the current sample) with effective average tax rates on highly
profitable enterprises; investment from these corporations should be the focus of much
international tax competition.11
11

I estimate, below, the final model of corporate tax burdens with a measure of effective average

corporate tax rates as a key test of the robustness of core findings. In the Online Appendix (see
http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml), I offer other tests of model robustness
and generalizability. Indicators of effective average corporate rates are used as secondary
measures of corporate taxation as they are available for fewer country years and are computed
15

A basic linear model of corporate tax rates is given by:
Tax Ratei,t = α + φ(Tax Rate)i,t-1 + β1(International Capital Mobility)i,t-1 +

[Eq. 1]

β2(Trade Openness)i,t-1 + β3(Coordination)i,t-1
+ β4(Consensus Institutions/Partisan Veto Points)i,t-1 + β5(Institutional Veto
Points)i,t-1 + β6(Median Voter)i,t-1 + β7(Right Party Government)i,t-1 +
β8(Structural Unemployment)i,t-1 + β9(Public Debt)i,t + β10(Growth)i,t-1 +
β11(Profits)i,t-1 + β12(Investment)i,t-1 + εi,t ,
This model includes the basic exogenous factors discussed above; it also accounts for core
institutional variables. I use a standard-score index of coordination across four core dimensions,
namely, collective bargaining, enterprise-level labor-management relations, finance-producer
relations, and firm organization for collective business goods. (See the Appendix, below, on
measurement and data sources for all variables.) In addition, I include institutional veto points (a
standard score index of federalism, bicameralism, separation of powers, and judicial review), and
I use two indicators of partisan veto points; a measure of the parties-executives dimension of
consensus democracy (standard score index of electoral proportionality, the number of effective
legislative parties, and the number of governing parties) and a measure of the maximum
ideological distance between governing parties (Tsebelis 1999). For domestic constituency costs
(and constituency costs in competitor nations), I use primarily the Kim-Fording (1998; 2003)
measure of the ideological position of the median voter.12
with a variety of assumptions about corporate behavior and economic performance.
12

I also substitute related, alternative measures for the left-right orientation of the median

voter such as median voter support for redistribution (see results in the Online Appendix).
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The basic model of Eq. 1 assumes independence in national responses, or that the shift to
a market-conforming tax model is a function of varying national responses to common domestic
and international forces; policy makers may respond to perceived competitive pressures
associated with higher trade and capital openness, but they do so independently of specific policy
choices in other nations. We want, however, to allow for and assess the role of alternative forms
of strategic interdependence among governments. Thus, I test the proposition that policy makers
monitored and responded to the first move of the globe’s dominant economy (that is, the
Stackelberg leader):
Tax Ratei,t = α + φ(Tax Rate)i,t-1 + φus ( U.S. Tax Rate)i,t-1 +

[Eq. 2]

β1(International Capital Mobility)i,t-1 + .............
β12(Investment)i,t-1 + εi,t ,
where φus captures the effect of U.S. reforms in corporate taxation in other nations.
To test Basinger and Hallerberg’s Nash model of strategic interdependence, I estimate the
effect of competition-weighted shifts in the ideological position of the median voter
(“constituency costs” of tax reform), the degree of ideological distance among governing parties
(“transactions costs” of tax reform), and the liberalization of capital controls in other nations.
Thus, a straightforward empirical model for the Nash game of strategic interdependence is:
Tax Ratei,t = α + φ(Tax Rate)i,t-1 + φc1(Median Voter competition weighted
φc2(Ideological Distance competition weighted
φc3(Capital Liberalization competition weighted

j-n )i,t-1,

j-n )i,t-1,

+ [Eq. 3]

+

j-n )i,t-1,

β1(International Capital Mobility)i,t-1 + ............. β12(Investment)i,t-1 + εi,t ,
where these three signals of tax reform effort in each of j-n countries are weighted by the
17

correlation at t-1 between some country’s pattern of trade and the focal country’s (i) pattern of
trade. The pattern-of-trade variable for any country at t-1 is the inflow and outflow of
merchandise trade relative to GDP for the nation and each of the other (17) developed capitalist
democracies. Thus, if say Sweden and Denmark’s pattern of trade at some time point, t-1, is
correlated at .93, the weight for the signal of policy reform effort in Sweden at t-1, if the point of
interest is tax policy in Denmark at time t, is .93. The variable, (Tax Reform Effort Signal
competition weighted j-n)i,t-1,

is the mean of these weighted lag signals of reform effort for countries j-

n.13 That is, for some time t-1 and country i, where s is the signal of tax reform effort in the
competitor and w is the pattern-of-trade-correlation weight, the weighted signal of tax reform
effort is: (wijsj + wiksk …. + winsn)/(wij + wik …. + win)
After tests of tax competition hypotheses, I focus on the possibility that tax competition is
mediated by domestic institutions. First, I address Hays’ (2003; 2009) argument by examining
whether capital mobility’s impacts are conditioned by consensus institutions. I then assess
whether tax competition (for instance, pressures from prior US rate change) is mediated by
coordination as well as other domestic political and institutional conditions (the magnitude of
transactions costs and so forth). These tests are made through interaction analysis (Kam and
13

It is important to note that the use of bilateral trade data also effectively proxies

bilateral capital stock and flow relations between two nations. For instance, the simple crossnational correlation between trade with the US and capital stock position with the U.S. (19891991 means) is .689 (p<.01) for OECD nations. The highly significant correlations for bilateral
trade and capital flows for any pair of economies at t time points range from roughly .5 to .98 for
nations in the sample.
18

Franzese 2009).
It is also important to mention three specification issues. First, statutory rates at time t
invariably reflect policy decisions at time t-1. Even for those instances where rates at time t are
the product of earlier, multi-year policy choices, policy makers ratify or modify those rate
changes in t-1. Thus, when examining forms of Nash strategic interdependence, one has to
examine other nations’ signals of likely change in tax effort at t-1. In the Stackelberg model, the
leader moves first (i.e., in t-1). Second, I assume that current changes in statutory rates in some
country are not significant predictors of past levels and changes in U.S. rates or in signals of tax
reform effort in competitors. That is, I assume endogeneity should not be a serious problem. (In
results reported in the Online Appendix, I do estimate a conventional spatial lag model where
current changes in rates are modeled as functions of current changes in competitors; there, I use
an instrumental variable model in the presence of a real threat of endogeneity.)
Third, for theoretical and substantive reasons it is very useful to assess both long-term
relationships and short-term departures from equilibrium engendered by tax competition and
other forces; thus, I use an error correction mechanism (ECM) specification for the actual
estimation of the basic models of corporate tax rates. The estimating equation, therefore, takes
the following form (and I use the Stackelberg leadership model for illustration):
∆Tax Ratei,t = α + φ(Tax Rate)i,t-1 + φus ( U.S. Tax Rate)i,t-2 +

[Eq. 4]

φus∆ ( ∆U.S. Tax Rate)i,t-1 + β1(International Capital Mobility)i,t-2 +
β1∆(∆International Capital Mobility)i,t-1 +.............
β12(Investment)i,t-2 + β12∆(∆Investment)i,t-1 εi,t ,
ECM models operate on the assumption that the dependent variable (statutory corporate rates) is
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in general equilibrium with domestic and international political economic conditions. A change
in an exogenous variable produces a short-term impact on the dependent variable; if that change
is permanent, there is a long-term shift in the dependent variable toward a new equilibrium level.
In a concrete sense, changes in statutory tax rates are modeled as a function of past levels
of tax rates and changes and levels of exogenous variables. The coefficient for change in some
causal factor is the short-term effect of that variable on statutory rates while the coefficient for
levels is the long-run impact of that variable on rates. The actual long-term impact of some
exogenous variable is, - β /φ, where β is the estimated coefficient for the level of the causal
variable and φ is the coefficient for lagged statutory tax rates (see Beck [2001] and, especially,
Beck [1991] on this estimator).14 I follow Beck (1991) and estimate the ECM model with one
year lags in changes and two-year lags in levels. This is a reasonable alternative to the
conventional unlagged changes and one-year lagged levels when clear time lags are present.
The error correction models are estimated by OLS regression analysis with panel correct
standard errors. Overall, this estimator will typically address common problems of
contemporaneously correlated, crossnationally heteroskedastic, and serially correlated errors
present in pooled time series, cross sectional data (Beck 2001). To minimize the risks of bias

14

Thus, as Huber (1998) suggests, calculation of the long-term effect of exogenous

factors in ERM models proceeds as it does in standard lagged dependent variable models. The
long-term effect unfolds over several periods with the speed of adjustment given by φ. That is,
the gap between the old and new equilibrium levels in the dependent variable decreases by the
proportion, φ, in each period.
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from omitted cross-national variables, I also estimate core models with fixed country effects.15
I also explore an additional set of tax competition hypotheses and assess the impacts of
additional control variables. For instance, I test a more basic formulation of strategic
interdependence by estimating the effect of competition- weighted tax rates themselves (that is, a
conventional spatial lag model). I also assess the impact of East European states’ tax reforms (for
instance, the widespread adoption of the flat tax) on rich European nations’ corporate tax rates.
As to further controls, I estimate models with a variety of additional variables, most notably,
population size and capital flows (in place of liberalization of capital controls). These and other
tests are reported in the Online Appendix.
Findings
Results of the estimation of the basic model of corporate tax rates (without strategic
interaction) are presented in the first column of Table 1. The tax effects of commonly
experienced international forces are as follows. The level of (and changes in) trade openness and
liberalization of international capital controls in prior years are significantly associated with
reductions in statutory corporate rates. The substantive effects of shifts in the levels of trade and
capital openness are substantial: a 10 point increase in trade openness (exports and imports as
percentages of GDP) results in a 2.83 decrease in statutory rates (recall that the long-term impact
of a variable is given by, - β /φ). A five point rise in Quinn’s index of capital liberalization (0.0
to 100 scale) results in a 2.6 point decline in rates. Taken together, these findings suggest that
15

F-tests suggest inclusion of fixed country effects. The presence of these “country

dummies,” however, risks inconsistency of estimates as t grows relatively small in relation to n;
this should be a minimal problem relative to bias in models such as those estimated here.
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rises in internationalization engender long-term reductions in corporate tax rates as policy
makers seek mobile assets and general efficiency gains.
– Table 1 about here –
The second through fourth columns of Table 1 report results of tests of competing models
of strategic tax competition. First, the Stackelberg leadership model of column two indicates that
U.S. corporate tax reforms have elicited significant policy changes in other developed
democracies: a one point cut in levels of U.S. rates results in a 1.1 point cut in levels of tax rates
in other nations. A short-term change in U.S. rates of one point also generates an immediate
change in corporate rates in other countries (of the magnitude of .37 points); the remainder of the
1.1 point gap between old and new long-term equilibrium levels of corporate rates will decline
by a proportion of .244 a year. This long-term impact of U.S. rate change will play itself out in
about six years.
The column three model also generates support (albeit weak) for the Nash game of
strategic competition among competitors. As levels of capital control liberalization increase in
competitor nations by five points, a typical nation will reduce rates by 2.64 points in the long
term. On the other hand, shifts in the levels or changes in partisan veto points and median voter
ideology in competitors have insignificant or incorrectly signed impacts on statutory corporate
tax rates.
Finally, I assess a mixed Stackelberg-Nash model in the fourth column of Table 1. I
include only the significant capital control liberalization signal of tax reform effort in
competitors. The results are the same if I include the insignificant partisan veto points or
incorrectly signed median voter variables. As the table indicates, once U.S. tax reforms are
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accounted, the effect on statutory rates of capital control liberalization in competitor nations is
only marginally significant. Moreover, this effect disappears in some subsequent models. As a
result, I use the highly robust Stackelberg leadership model as the baseline for analyses of the
impacts of U.S. tax reform across divergent domestic political and institutional contexts below.
With respect to domestic forces, (levels of) the ideological position of the median voter
(0.0 to 100 point scale where higher scores denote more collectivist orientations) and the extent
of institutional veto points directly constrained tax policy change (see Table 2 for more evidence
on the strength of institutional veto points). Where median voters lean left and where power is
institutionally dispersed, corporate tax burdens do not fall as quickly as in polities with
concentrated authority and with right-leaning voters. On the other hand, partisan veto points (as
measured by either consensus democracy or ideological distance between governing parties) and
right government did not directly shape tax reform. With respect to coordination, the direct effect
of the level of coordination is significant in the majority of Table 1 and 2 equations. With regard
to domestic fiscal and economic forces, higher public sector debt constrains and slower profit
growth promotes neoliberal tax reforms. For instance, the long-term impact of an additional 10
points of public debt (percentage points of GDP) on statutory rates is + 1.3. Overall, the findings
on domestic constituency and transactions costs as well as fiscal constraints are robust across
subsequent models of corporate tax policy.
– Table 2 about here –
I present the results of estimation of models of politically and institutionally mediated tax
competition in Table 2. The column one model assesses whether the general corporate tax rate
impact of capital control liberalization is mediated by consensus institutions (as suggested by
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Hays 2003; 2009). Columns two and three present tests of the hypotheses that domestic political
transactions and constituency costs condition the impact of tax competition (in the form of
Stackelberg leadership effects of U.S. tax policy). As the table reveals, the interaction between
(levels or changes in) capital control liberalization and consensus institutions is insignificant. On
the other hand, when actual capital flows is substituted for capital control liberalization, the
interaction between levels of capital openness and consensus democracy is significant and
positive. The actual magnitude of coefficients for the direct effect of capital flows (-.018) and the
interaction (.030) indicate that at moderately high levels of consensus democracy (index values
of greater than .5), the negative effect of capital flows on statutory rates disappears. (See Note 19
below on the mathematics of interactions.) Overall, this pattern of findings as well as subsequent
findings on the salience of consensus institutions in Table 2 suggests at least a modicum of
support for Hays’ thesis.16
With respect to the institutional mediation of pressures from tax competition, both
consensus democracy and the ideological position of the median voter mediate competitive
pressures from recent changes in U.S. tax rates. In the case of both political factors, changes in
U.S. rates have diminishing and, eventually, insignificant effects on statutory rates; that is, a cut
in U.S. rates engenders rate cuts in majoritarian polities and where the median voter leans right,
but these impacts dissipate when we move to consensus democracies and more collectivist
electorates (see Note 19 on interactions). 17
16

I report the full results for key models that substitute capital flows for capital

liberalization in the Online Appendix.
17

In addition to the institutional mediation of U.S. reforms, I assessed the institutional
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The fourth column presents a test of my central argument that where the institutions of
economic coordination are strong, neoliberal tax effects of international competitive pressures
should be weak or non-existent. As the table reveals, there is a significant (and substantively
large) negative interaction between changes in U.S. rates and coordination (short-term effects).
There is a significant (but substantively small) positive interaction between levels of U.S. tax
rates and coordination (long-term effects), although a shift in levels of U.S. rates is associated
positively with levels of statutory rates in all types of political economies.18
On the short term effects of U.S. reforms across levels of coordination, the mathematics
of interactions suggest that an additional cut of one point in U.S. statutory rates is associated with
mediation of capital mobility and trade openness’ impacts on rates. Beyond consensus
institutions and the median voter, I also included (as a second measure of partisan veto points)
the maximum ideological distance between governing parties as well as institutional veto points
as possible mediating factors. These tests produced largely null findings, incorrectly signed
coefficients, and/or non-robust results.
18

That is, neoliberal reforms in the U.S. produce neoliberal reforms in all types of

polities in the long-run. The positive interaction between levels of U.S. rates and coordination, a
finding that suggests greater long-term change in response to U.S. reforms in CMEs, might be
questioned because of very high levels of multicollinearity between levels of U.S. rates and
interaction terms that include these levels and institutional factors. (High levels of
multicollinearity are defined as those where “R2-deletes” are in excess of .85; an R2-delete is the
multiple correlation coefficient obtained by regressing a right-hand side variable on all other
exogenous variables.)
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immediate cuts of .75 in tax rates in a set of typical LMEs, as theory predicts; changes in U.S.
rates are insignificantly related to short-term changes in statutory rates in a set of typical
CMEs.19 Figure 2 displays the marginal short-term tax rate effects of a one point cut in U.S.
statutory rates for various levels of coordination. At relatively high levels of coordination (.9 or
higher on the index of coordination), the otherwise strong impact of U.S. tax reforms disappears
completely.
- Figure 2 about here Taken together, these results suggest the following: in the long-term, all advanced
capitalist democracies move with the U.S. in adopting the market-conforming tax regime. In the
short-term, however, there is substantial resistance to neoliberal tax reforms in CMEs. In fact,
estimates of corporate tax rate change from these models fit the empirical record well: in most
CMEs, adoption of the neoliberal tax structure of lower rates and broader bases occurs a few
years after initial moves by U.S. policy makers (e.g., in the early 1990s); LMEs followed the
U.S. immediately with tax reforms in the late 1980s. In the end, however, all political economies
moved to the structure of lower statutory rates and broader tax bases.
19

Recall that the effect of some variable X1 on Y at variable levels of X2 is given by β1 +

β3[X2], where β3 is

the coefficient for the interaction of X1 and X2. Standard errors for these

marginal effects are readily computed (Kam and Franzese 2009). For the short-term impacts of
changes in U.S. rates, the equations for CMEs and LMEs are, respectively: .04121 + (-.3119[.9])
= .1314; and .4121 + (-.3119[-1.11]) = .7552), where .90 is the mean 1980-1983 level of
coordination in the CME proto-types Austria, Norway, and Sweden and -1.11 is the 1980-1983
mean coordination in the LME countries of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
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The fifth and sixth columns of Table 2 address the question of whether or not
coordination, consensus democracy, and the ideological position of the median voter all
independently mediate tax competition’s impact on tax reform. That is, theory suggests
coordination’s mediating role occurs through the operation of associated consensus institutions
and collective-oriented median voter dynamics as well as through direct mechanisms. An
alternative view is that coordination only matters because it is related to consensus democracy
and left-leaning voters. I offer suggestive evidence in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 2. I
say “suggestive” because levels of multicollinearity are high for several components of the two
sets of interactions in each column; sign-flips and insignificance of coefficients may occur (Kam
and Franzese 2009). The inclusion of three sets of interactions heightens multicollinearity even
further and, thus, is not used.
As Table 2 reveals, the core mediation effect of coordination is robust to inclusion of
either consensus democracy or median voter ideology. In addition, both of these variables
continue to play a significant role in mediating international tax competition (although the shape
of the mediating role changes a bit with multiple sets of interactions). While coordination and
median voter ideology both act to mitigate the short-run impacts of U.S. tax reforms, consensus
institutions appear to weaken the long-term effect of neoliberal tax policy. Overall, these
findings provide some support for the argument that non-market coordination and its political
institutional correlates significantly condition international competition’s impacts on tax policy
change in postindustrial capitalist democracies.
As a core test of the robustness of findings, I estimate the “final” model of statutory
corporate tax rates for the effective average tax rate on “high profit” corporations (40 percent
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rate of return). As revealed in Table 2, the institutional mediation of tax competition (in the form
of Stackelberg dynamics mediated by coordination) is reproduced for high profit enterprises’
effective average tax rates. So too are the findings that institutional veto points, left-leaning
median voters, and profit rates directly shape tax policy change. The only notable differences
between statutory and effective average tax rate models is, first, that the fiscal health of the polity
is no longer a significant constraint on reform of effective rates on high profit enterprises.
Second, economic growth independently influences effective corporate tax rates. Finally, the
direct impacts of trade and capital openness fall below conventional significance levels in the
effective rate model of the final column of Table 2. Generally, these results along with those
reported in the Online Appendix suggest most core findings are robust to a variety of alternative
specifications and estimations.
Conclusions
During the past two decades, the tax treatment of corporate income has changed
dramatically across the capitalist democracies. While the pace and depth of change is different
across nations and time periods, corporate tax rates have been reduced and the tax bases
broadened through reductions in investment credits and allowances in virtually all countries. In
fact, not only have instruments and the settings of those instruments been altered, but the basic
goals of tax policy have seemingly shifted from redistribution and interventionism toward
efficiency (Swank and Steinmo 2002; Swank 2006). What role has tax competition played in the
transformation of corporate taxation and what form has it taken? How have domestic institutions
shaped competition’s policy impacts?
The findings presented in this paper offer new insights on these questions, and they
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affirm some earlier results for a larger sample of country years and of more dimensions of tax
competition, political institutions, and their interactions. The transformation of corporate tax
policy was shaped by the responsiveness of incumbent governments to common international
and domestic pressures. Increases in international integration of markets for goods, services and
capital militated toward adoption of market-conforming tax structure; the room for maneuver by
policy makers, however, was in all likelihood constrained by domestic constituency,
transactions, and fiscal costs. That is, I find substantial evidence that left-leaning voters, the
institutional dispersion of power, and levels of public debt directly constrained neoliberal
reforms; declines in profit rates promoted tax cuts.
The shift to neoliberal tax structure was, however, by no means solely a response by
national policy makers to these commonly experienced forces. The transformation of corporate
tax policy was driven, in part, by strategic tax competition between nations. While several
alternative forms of tax competition are plausible, analysis presented here strongly points to the
role of competitive responses to the 1980s tax reform in the United States. Moreover, there is
clear and robust evidence that domestic institutions and politics condition the speed of policy
responsiveness to the Stackelberg leader; findings strongly suggest that the degree a nation is
characterized by coordinated market institutions – centralized collective bargaining between well
organized labor and employers, high levels of cooperation by private firms in provision of
collective business goods and stable finance, and related institutions and their political correlates
– determines the speed at which the U.S. inspired reforms are adapted. In LMEs, the perceived
relative political and economic benefits of following the United States offset the (relatively low)
costs of negotiating change across resistant voters and veto points and of economic uncertainty.
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These costs were clearly more pronounced in CMEs and the benefits to policy makers of
neoliberal reforms smaller and less certain. Nevertheless, in the long run, all nations moved in
the direction of the United States; indeed, as the first decade of the 21st Century drew to a close,
the neoliberal structure of corporate taxation had spread throughout the rich capitalist
democracies.
It is also important to note that the recent global financial crisis and attendant great
recession have not in all likelihood initiated a long-term reversal of this process. On the one
hand, this paper’s analysis suggests that the recent growth in public sector debt in many
advanced democracies has placed upward pressure on corporate rates since 2008. On the other,
the resilience of neoliberalism at elite and mass levels (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013), the decline
of coordination in some nations (Martin and Swank 2012; Thelen 2014), and further pressure on
the U.S. to reduce its post-1980s statutory rate suggest continued movement toward lower rates
and market-conforming tax structure. The principal offsetting force consists of ongoing efforts
between all advanced democracies, and especially among members of the European Union, to
bolster tax coordination. The difficulties of cooperation on tax policy, however, among generally
competitive states of different size are significant (Genschel and Schwarz 2011).
Finally, one might reflect on the implications of this analysis for the spread of neoliberal
institutions and the broader transformation of advanced democratic capitalism. Some scholars
have argued that core features of coordinated capitalism such as highly centralized labor and
industrial relations systems have significantly liberalized (e.g., Baccaro and Howell 2011).
Others have argued that while many of the formal institutions of CMEs have not undergone
significant neoliberal reform, informal practices and outcomes have increasingly resembled less
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egalitarian and less cooperative LMEs (e.g., Thelen 2014). In fact, Wolfgang Streek (2009)
offers a systematic analysis of institutional change in Germany and concludes that most
institutional spheres – from labor and institutional relations to social policy – have effectively
liberalized. The present analysis of tax policy sheds some light on underlying dynamics of
institutional change and on the dilemma facing proponents of coordinated market institutions.
First, the theory and empirical evidence of the present paper argues that neoliberal policies and
institutions spread slowly in the environment of coordinated market economies. The assessment
of political and economic benefits and costs by policy makers in coordinated systems and their
pursuant choices clearly explain this inertia. Yet, the present work suggests as coordinated
institutions and attendant policies and practices erode in the long term, the political economic
calculus that buffers CMEs from rapid reform will shift in the favor of neoliberalism; if one can
generalize from tax policy, this shift has been going on for some time. Yet, final conclusions
about convergence around conventional neoliberal institutions in advanced democratic
capitalism await more evidence on national trajectories in the wake of the financial crisis, on the
emergence of potentially dominant postindustrial political coalitions, and on new, alternative
forms and mixes of political economic institutions.

APPENDIX
Operationalization and Data Sources
Statutory and Effective Average Corporate Tax Rates: See text. Sources: For statutory rates,
OECD Taxation Database. For effective and marginal corporate rates, Institute of Fiscal
Studies; on computation of rates see Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002).
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International Capital Mobility: Index of the liberalization of financial and capital controls
developed by Quinn (1997) where liberalization is a 0.0 to 100.0 mean scale of the
removal of capital controls and restrictions on current account transactions. Source: data
from Dennis Quinn, Graduate School of Business, Georgetown University.
Trade Openness: exports and imports as percentages of GDP. Source: components from OECD
iLibrary.
Bilateral Trade Flows: exports and imports of merchandise (as a percentage of GDP) between
nation i and nation j at t. Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Statistics Yearbook (Paris: IMF, selected years).
Right Government: Percentage of cabinet portfolios held by Right parties (mean of one-to-threeyear lags). Source: Comparative Parties Data Set, available at
(http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml).
Coordination. See text. For extensive details on measurement and data sources for employer and
union organization, see Swank (2014). On finance producer relations, labor-management
relations, and cooperation for collective business goods, see online appendix for Martin
and Swank (2012): http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politicsinternational-relations/comparative-politics/political-construction-business-interestscoordination-growth-and-equality.
Median Voter: Ideological position of median voters as developed by Kim and Fording (1998;
2003), where median voter position is computed from vote shares for ideologically
ranked parties (28-item index of a parties’ positions on traditional left-right continuum)
through the application of the formula for the median in grouped data. The Kim-Fording
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measure of voter ideology (1945-2003 data) supplied by HeeMin Kim, Florida State
University. Updates computed from European Journal of Political Research “Political
Data” reports on annual elections and Party Manifesto Data Base data on ideological
positions of parties (Volkens, et al 2014).
Support for Redistribution: I follow Plümper, Troeger, and Winner (2009) and measure support
for redistribution as the median (and mean) scores of citizens’ reponses to the statement:
“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between
people with high incomes and those with low incomes” (1.0-5.0 ordinal scale of supportopposition). Source: International Social Survey Programm (Role of Government, Social
Inequality series). Second, I use the pre-fisc GINI index of inequality and changes
between pre- and post-fisc GINIs as proxies for demands/support for redistribution.
Source: OECD Inequality Data Set, OECD iLibrary.
Institutional Veto Points: Standard score index for temporally and cross-nationally varying
measures of federalism/decentralization, bicameralism, presidentialism, and judicial
review. Source: Lijphart (2012) and country specific sources.
Consensus Democracy: standard score index of proportionality of electoral system, number of
effective legislative parties; number of governing parties. Source: computations following
procedures outlined in Lijphart (2012) where data are from Thomas Mackie and Richard
Rose, International Almanac of Electoral History (Macmillan, 1991); “Political Data”
updates in European Journal of Political Research (selected years).
Partisan Veto Points: maximum ideological distance among government parties; Kim-Fording
measure of party ideology. Source: 1945-2003 data supplied by HeeMin Kim,
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Department of Political Science, Florida State University. Updates computed from
European Journal of Political Research “Political Data” reports on annual elections in
developed democracies and Party Manifesto Data Base data on ideological positions of
parties.
Structural Unemployment: the percentage of the civilian labor force unemployed for one year or
more. Source: OECD iLibrary.
Profits: Percentage change in real operating surplus. Source: OECD iLibrary.
Investment: Percentage change in gross fixed capital accumulation. Source: OECD iLibrary.
Growth: Percentage change in real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table Version 7.0,
Center for International Comparisons of Production.
Public Sector Debt: Gross public debt as a percent of GDP. Source: OECD iLibrary.
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Table 1: The Impact of International Competition on Statutory Tax Rates on Corporate Income, 1982-2008,
Globalization- Policy
Independence

Stackelberg Leadership

Nash Strategic
Interdependence

Mixed Model
Stackelberg-Nash

Tax Competition
US Statutory
Corporate Rate t-2

---

.2659**
(.0481)

---

.1751**
(.0763)

△ US Statutory
Corporate Tax Rate t-1

---

.3721**
(.0898)

---

.3459**
(.0949)

Partisan Veto Power
in Competitors t-2

---

---

.0623
(.0506)

---

△ Partisan Veto Power
Competitors t-1

---

---

.0547
(.0549)

---

Ideology of Median
Voter Competitors t-2

---

---

-.0467
(.0434)

---

△ Ideology of Median
Voter Competitors t-1

---

---

-.2203**
(.1060)

---

Capital Controls in
Competitors t-2

---

---

-.1287**
(.0352)

-.0723*
(.0493)

△ Capital Controls in
Competitors t-1

---

---

-.1601**
(.0915)

-.1000
(.1019)

Trade Openness t-2

-.0486**
(.0201)

-.0787**
(.0180)

-.0470**
(.0186)

-.0731**
(.0188)

△ Trade Openness t-1

-.0577*
(.0374)

-.0360
(.0323)

-.0449*
(.0329)

-.0382
(.0324)

Liberalization of
Capital Markets t-2

-.0892**
(.0188)

-.0590**
(.0183)

-.0742**
(.0172)

-.0590**
(.0181)

△ Liberalization of
Capital Markets t-1

-.0655*
(.0305)

-.0253
(.0301)

-.0446*
(.0304)

-.0260
(.0305)

Coordination t-2

.0855
(.8746)

1.8400**
(.9299)

.6667
(.9365)

1.7803**
(.9205)

△ Coordination t-1

-1.4029
(1.5739)

-.0640
(1.6066)

-1.1377
(.15493)

-.1206
(1.5882)

Consensus Demo t-2

.2976
(.5785)

.5691
(.5676)

.6111
(.5886)

.7621*
(.5774)

△ Consensus Demo t-1

1.0008
(.8817)

.9353
(.8521)

.9638
(.8539)

1.0694
(.8533)

Institutional Veto
Points t-2

1.2518
(1.1779)

3.0511**
(1.2327)

-.0863
(.4340)

3.2067**
(1.2392)

△ Institutional Veto
Points t-1

1.5784
(1.9419)

2.8321*
(1.9162)

.6890
(1.8439)

3.0282*
(1.9248)

International Openness

Institutions and Politics
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Globalization- Policy
Independence

Stackelberg Leadership

Nash Strategic
Interdependence

Mixed Model
Stackelberg-Nash

Ideology -Median
Voter t-2

.0264*
(.0192)

.0327**
(.0173)

.0314**
(.0172)

.0250*
(.0181)

△ Ideology -Median
Voter t-1

.0062
(.0395)

.0391
(.0378)

.0308
(.0376)

.0377
(.0380)

Right Government

-.0004
(.0035)

.0021
(.0039)

-.0018
(.0032)

.0016
(.0039)

.0133
(.0086)

.0118
(.0094)

.0099
(.0082)

.0104
(.0093)

t-4 to t-2

△ Right Government
t-4 to t-2

General Model
Structural
Unemployment

t-2

-.0333*
(.0201)

-.0127
(.0202)

-.0365**
(.0206)

-.0165
(.0264)

△ Structural
Unemployment

t-1

-.0324
(.0356)

-.0390
(.0337)

-.0455*
(.0339)

-.0404
(.0339)

Public Sector Debtt-2

.0228**
(.0100)

.0311**
(.0109)

.0304**
(.0110)

.0328**
(.0113)

△ Public Sector
Debtt-1

.0985**
(.0400)

.0511
(.0410)

.0676**
(.0391)

.0520
(.0410)

Percent Change Real
Profitst-2

.0947*
(.0584)

.0567
(.0570)

.0661
(.0568)

.0572
(.0574)

△ Percent Change
Real Profitst-1

.0606*
(.0425)

.0531*
(.0414)

.0424
(.0408)

.0540*
(.0415)

Domestic
Investmentt-2

.0375
(.0439)

.0122
(.0433)

.0244
(.0431)

.0090
(.0435)

△ Domestic
Investmentt-1

-.0053
(.0257)

-.0162
(.0296)

-.0124
(.0284)

-.0136
(.0294)

Growth Per Capita
Real GDP t-2

.0755
(.1431)

.1606
(.1427)

.0995
(.1421)

.1765
(.1436)

△ Growth Per Capita
Real GDP t-1 (× 100)

-.0028
(.0034)

-.0008
(.0032)

-.0001
(.0035)

-.0005
(.0033)

-.1715**
(.0286)

-.2440**
(.0340)

-.2445**
(.0362)

-.2532**
(.0361)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

12.3744

8.0039

30.0561

19.0609

497

469

497

469

.1612

.2233

.2115

.2271

Tax Rate t-1

Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R

2

Statutory corporate tax models are estimated with 1982-2008 data by OLS for 18 or 17 nations (full sample with or
without U.S.) The table reports OLS unstandardized regression coefficients and panel correct standard errors (Beck
and Katz 1996).
* indicates significance at the .10 level or below.
** indicates significance at the .05 level or below.
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Table 2: Domestic Institutions and International Competition in Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1982-2008.
Capital
Mobility Consensus
Democracy

US LeadershipConsensus
Democracy

US LeadershipMedian Voter

CMEs versus
LMEs

US LeadershipConsensus and
Coordination

US
LeadershipMedian Vote
and Coord

Effective
Corporate Tax
Rates

Competition and Institutions
US Statutory/Effective
Corporate Tax Rate t-2

.2172**
(.0482)

.2695**
(.0477)

-.1396
(.1801)

.2608**
(.0482)

.2516**
(.0477)

-.0471
(.1954)

.4876**
(.0852)

△ US Statutory/Effective
Corporate Tax Rate t-1

.3735**
(.0902)

.3706**
(.0896)

1.6044**
(.4473)

.4121**
(.0887)

.4043**
(.0878)

1.2906**
(.5132)

.2200**
(.1041)

Capital Liberalization ×
Consensus Democracy t-2

.0024
(.0151)

---

---

---

---

---

---

△Capital Liberalization ×
Consensus Democracy t-2

.0085
(.0346)

---

---

---

---

---

---

US Statutory Rate ×
Consensus Democracy t-2

---

-.0030
(.0312)

---

---

-.0927**
(.0299)

---

---

△ US Statutory Rate ×
Consensus Democracy t-2

---

-.2564**
(.0818)

---

---

-.1251**
(.0687)

---

---

US Statutory Rate ×
Median Voter t-2

---

---

.0079**
(.0032)

--

---

.0060**
(.0036)

---

△ US Statutory Rate ×
Median Voter t-2

---

---

-.0229**
(.0082)

---

---

-.0166**
(.0095)

---

US Stat/Effect Rate ×
Coordination t-2

---

---

---

.1152**
(.0442)

.1746**
(.0479)

.0834**
(.0468)

.0907**
(.0567)

△ US Stat/Effect Rate ×
Coordination t-2

---

---

---

-.3119**
(.0909)

-.2448**
(.0860)

-.2263**
(.1072)

-.1764**
(.0867)

-.0789**
(.0182)

-.0794**
(.0181)

-.0951**
(.0184)

-.0884**
(.0180)

-.0939**
(.0187)

-.0640**
(.0317)

-.0231
(.0228)

-.0354
(.0326)

-.0412
(.0324)

-.0605**
(.0321)

-.0493**
(.0317)

-.0521*
(.0319)

-.0640**
(.0317)

-.0429
(.0587)

International Openness
Trade Openness t-2
△ Trade Openness t-1

43

Liberalization of
Capital Markets t-2

-.0594**
(.0194)

-.0534**
(.0192)

-.0348**
(.0197)

-.0493**
(.0186)

-.0534**
(.0185)

-.0339**
(.0191)

-.0230
(.0237)

△ Liberalization of
Capital Markets t-1

-.0267
(.0310)

-.0288
(.0298)

-.0122
(.0298)

-.0144
(.0291)

-.0178
(.0290)

-.0073
(.0292)

.0846**
(.0422)

Coordination t-2

1.8820**
(.9475)

1.7080**
(.9614)

1.3001*
(.8322)

-4.9352*
(2.7929)

-7.4143**
(2.8900)

-3.4740
(2.8560)

1.0184
(3.1279)

△ Coordination t-1

-.0324
(1.6067)

-.1226
(1.5909)

-.5472
(1.5522)

-1.3828
(1.5784)

-1.2731
(1.5667)

-1.3798
(1.591

1.7735
(2.1658)

Consensus Demo t-2

.3660
(1.4454)

.5034
(1.4802)

.4871
(.5374)

.3751
(.5376)

4.2167**
(1.3926)

.3659
(.5201)

.9904
(1.0281)

△ Consensus Demo t-1

.9454
(.8577)

.9712
(.8348)

1.0664*
(.8218)

.8946
(.8075)

.9508
(.8076)

1.0046
(.7991)

2.2380**
(1.1155)

Institutional Veto
Points t-2

3.0200**
(1.3040)

2.7979**
(1.2669)

2.1698**
(1.2125)

2.4663**
(1.1712)

1.5855*
(1.1769)

1.9599**
(1.1917)

3.4284**
(1.3655)

△ Institutional Veto
Points t-1

2.8560*
(1.9093)

2.03588*
(1.9268)

2.6622*
(1.9134)

2.5848*
(1.8947)

2.4815*
(1.8713)

2.5128*
(1.8986)

4.7202**
(1.8536)

Ideology -Median
Voter t-2

.0336**
(.0171)

.0306**
(.0170)

-.3089**
(.1376)

.0239*
(.0170)

.0271*
(.0169)

-.2334
(.1496)

.0664**
(.0245)

△ Ideology -Median
Voter t-1

.0405
(.0379)

.0429
(.0376)

.0549*
(.0380)

.0413
(.0374)

.05118*
(.0376)

.0520*
(.0381)

.1234**
(.0528)

Right Government

.0020
(.0038)

.0021
(.0040)

.0022
(.0039)

.0031
(.0039)

.0023
(.0039)

.0029
(.0038)

.0066
(.0048)

.0117
(.0094)

.0112
(.0093)

.0124
(.0094)

.0112
(.0094)

.0110
(.0094)

.0119
(.0094)

.0182
(.0116)

Institutions and Politics

t-4 to t-2

△ Right Government
t-4 to t-2

General Model
Structural
Unemployment

t-2

-.0125
(.0198)

-.0146
(.0201)

-.0049
(.0206)

-.0118
(.0194)

-.0120
(.0197)

-.0064
(.0202)

.3080
(.0355)

△ Structural
Unemployment

t-1

-.0385
(.0339)

-.0419
(.0335)

-.0343
(.333)

-.0420
(.0331)

-.0366
(.0332)

-.0378
(.0332)

.0029
(.0628)
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Public Sector Debtt-2

.0314**
(.0115)

.0308**
(.0116)

.0204**
(.0111)

.0264**
(.0119)

.0279**
(.0117)

.0197**
(.0117)

.0067
(.0156)

△ Public Sector
Debtt-1

.0517
(.0418)

.0396
(.0409)

.0437
(.0409)

.0409
(.0404)

.0417
(.0404)

.0380
(.0403)

.0333
(.0602)

Percent Change Real
Profitst-2

.0558
(.0576)

.0649
(.0573)

.1018**
(.0567)

.0705
(.0565)

.0674
(.0568)

.1002**
(.0512)

.0586
(.7060)

△ Percent Change
Real Profitst-1

.0526
(.0415)

.0574*
(.0410)

.0670
(.0402)

.0602*
(.0403)

.0574*
(.0463)

.0687**
(.0397)

.1733**
(.0545)

Domestic
Investmentt-2

.0115
(.0432)

.0058
(.0424)

.0141
(.0411)

.0130
(.0416)

.0114
(.04170

.0143
(.0404)

-.0663
(.0654)

△ Domestic
Investmentt-1

-.0163
(.0296)

-.0191
(.02860

-.0119
(.0282)

-.0188
(.0279)

-.0198
(.0278)

-.0150
(.0272)

-.0139
(.0367)

Growth Per Capita
Real GDP t-2

.1642
(.1430)

.1564
(.1438)

.1310
(.1380)

.1271
(.1427)

.1344
(.1432)

.1142
(.01395)

.4721**
(.2132)

△ Growth Per Capita
Real GDP t-1(× 100)

-.0008
(.0032)

-.0007
(.0033)

-.0003
(.0036)

-.0009
(.0033)

-.0007
(.0035)

-.0003
(.0036)

-.0008
(.0018)

-.2446**
(.0341)

-.2412**
(.0350)

-.2522**
(.0326)

-.2436**
(.0324)

-.2530**
(.0338)

-.2500**
(.0321)

-.3900**
(.0496)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

8.0368

7.1371

23.2973

6.1224

6.7376

18.3051

-.7837

469

469

469

469

469

469

365

.2234

.2338

.2572

.2560

.2625

.2720

.3232

Tax Rate t-1

Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R2

Statutory corporate tax models are estimated with 1982-2008 data by OLS for 17 nations (full sample without U.S.) The effective tax rate model of the last
column is estimated with 1982-2005 data for 16 nations. The table reports OLS unstandardized regression coefficients and panel correct standard errors (Beck
and Katz 1996).
* indicates significance at the .10 level or below.
** indicates significance at the .05 level or below.

45

